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ABSTRACT
The Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) introduces a new dimension to Australia's
land tenure systems; new property rights are established for native title
parties via the creation of a 'right to negotiate' (RTN) with respect to future
acts on land where native title might be determined. There is growing
recognition that, legal uncertainties about the potential co-existence of
native title on pastoral leases aside, there are elements of the NTA that are
resulting in suboptimal outcomes for the petroleum industry. Within a
Coasian analytical framework, it is demonstrated that, owing to unclear
property rights, transactions costs for negotiating exploration and
production with native title parties are high. Recognising this, the
Commonwealth government has proposed a package of amendments that
attempt to address industry concerns while balancing these against
Indigenous interests. These recommendations include a once-only RTN, a
higher threshold for registration of claims, automatic renewal of existing
production leases and mandatory statutory functions for Native Title
Representative Bodies that will require them to resolve competing native
title claims and to sign off agreements with resource developers. Noting
that strategic behaviour by industry, Indigenous parties and especially State
governments have hampered effective operations of the NTA, the paper
ends by considering the choices available to the petroleum industry to
ensure that statutory amendments are in its best interests.
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This article focuses very specifically on economic aspects of the Native
Title Act 1993 (NTA) passed in the aftermath of the Mabo High Court
judgment. This legislation introduces a new dimension to Australia's land
tenure system and, to date, there has been considerable discussion about its
potential, and actual, impacts on mineral exploration and mining.
However, there has been a far more limited discussion about the impacts of
this statutory framework on Australia's oil and gas exploration and
production industry (referred to hereafter as the petroleum industry,
including upstream production). It is argued here, from an economics
perspective, that key changes are needed to the NTA framework to make it
more workable for the petroleum industry; however, the specific needs of
this industry are somewhat different from the mining sector more generally
and these differences will be highlighted.
With the election of the Howard Government in March 1996, there was a
real prospect that the strategic behaviour demonstrated by all parties
(including industry lobby groups, Indigenous parties and especially State
governments) since 1994 would end and that constructive negotiations
about amending the NTA would immediately occur. However, fine-tuning
the NTA to make it workable has already proven, after a few short months,
to be more complex than anticipated. This is partly a result of continuing
legal uncertainty about property rights on pastoral leasehold land. But it is
also a result of the complex interrelationships between many aspects of the
NTA and the increased polarisation and fragmentation of interest groups
that must be party to negotiations for change. Some matters may be
decided soon by the High Court and the analysis here will not speculate on
possible judicial outcomes. But there are other aspects of the NTA that
require statutory amendment based on a logical framework and these will
form the basis of discussion in this article.
The title of the 1996 Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration
Association (APPEA) Conference was 'Frontiers of Opportunity'.
Opportunity for the petroleum industry is predicated on clear definition of
property rights that will provide greater certainty, lower transactions costs
and a reasonable degree of predicability to allow well-informed
commercial decision-making. In May 1996, the Howard Government
released a discussion paper Towards a more workable native title act: an
outline of proposed amendments' with written comment invited by 18 June
1996 (Commonwealth of Australia 1996). In terms of ensuring that a more
workable NTA framework emerges, the petroleum industry, along with
other interest groups, is at a frontier. The analysis here outlines some
strategic options that the industry faces and canvasses risks associated with
pursuing a minimalist and piecemeal, rather than maximalist and holistic,
reform agenda. However, it is emphasised that the views expressed here
are the author's only and in the current uncertain political environment it is
recognised, unfortunately, that expediency might hold sway over economic
sense.
The NTA within an economics framework
The NTA has remained unchanged since December 1993 despite clear
recognition that it is functioning suboptimally. Up until the federal election
of March 1996, the Keating Government was committed to maintain the
NTA fundamentally unchanged to provide opportunity for all parties to test
the new law. In the lead-up to the election, however, there was bipartisan
recognition that the NTA needed amendment to make it more workable.
The critical issue that is emerging for the petroleum industry, with respect
to the NTA, is the potential difficulties in negotiating to undertake
exploration, production and production-related activities (so-called 'future
acts') on land (or onshore places) where native title may be extant. In short,
property rights on all land, except freehold land where native title has been
unquestionably extinguished,remain poorly defined. While all invalid past
acts have been validated by the NTA, future renewal of exploration leases
and production licences will require renegotiation under the statute.
As the native title debate has become increasingly politicised there has
been a growing tendency to revisit the theoretical Coasian framework of
welfare economics to seek to define, in an abstract manner, 'optimality'in
resource allocation (see Altman 1995; McKenna 1995; Industry
Commission 1996). After Coase (1960), it is hypothesised that to ensure
efficient allocation of resources, property rights must be clearly assigned
and legally enforceable. If property rights are poorly defined, the ensuing
uncertainty will result in reduced investment owing to rational risk
assessment and avoidance, given the ready availability of alternative
investment options. Poorly defined property rights also raise what Coase
(1960) termed 'transactions costs': the cost of finding native title parties
with whom to negotiate; the cost of negotiation; and the cost of enforcing a
contract. Even though in the real world transactions costs are never zero, as
assumed in the 'Coase theorem', there is intuitive appeal to the proposition
that efficient allocation of property rights can be achieved, irrespective of
who owns them, if parties are able to privately bargain.
To date, there has been no native title determination under the NTA
framework and there has been no substantive re-assignment of property
rights. However, the NTA has introduced the new legal concept of a 'right
to negotiate' (RTN) that native title parties (including claimants) have with
respect to exploration and production (see Davie 1996). This RTN is a
form of property because it can be traded away, much like a futures option;
mechanisms exist in the NTA framework to expedite land use if private
agreements can be reached and, conversely, the RTN can greatly increase
transactions costs if private deals cannot be struck and an arbitral body, the
National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT), needs to make a future act
determination.
It can be argued that the RTN, while strictly differentiated in the NTA
from a legal right of veto, is nonetheless a de facto right of veto in much
the same way as the Industry Commission (1991) argued that the right of
veto in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
constitutes a de facto mineral right.
While it was never the intent of the Keating Government to codify such
poor definition of property rights in the NTA, the RTN appears to fall mid-
way between a full right of veto (preferred by Indigenous interests) and the
normal recourse available to owners of freehold land to oppose exploration
and production on their land. This so-called freehold test was also created
in the NTA to ensure that native title parties are treated no worse than other
owners of land; in practice, there is a diversity in Federal and State
exploration and production statutory and regulatory regimes. The emerging
problems with the NTA are not the existence of the RTN per se, but the
fact that at present the RTN is disjunctive, that is, negotiations for a future
act must be exercised at exploration and production stages, hence
automatically raising both risk and transactions costs. This issue is being
addressed variably; for example, in Western Australia, the government is
issuing mining licences of 21 years duration for exploration and production
purposes.
Of greater significance are problems in identifying which native title party
holds the property right. In seeking appropriate parties with whom to
negotiate, four options arise: the right parties may be identified; the wrong
parties may make native title claim; no party may come forward (in
response to a non-claimant application); or multiple claimants may emerge,
some of whom are subsequently determined as native title holders, others
who are not. The last possibility is the most difficult case that requires a
creative policy solution.
The petroleum industry and the NTA
Most of the public debate, to date, about the workability of the NTA for
resource developers has focused on mining (Ewing 1994; Altman 1995;
Industry Commission 1996) rather than specifically on the petroleum
industry (major exceptions being Wells 1994, 1995; Vickery 1995). This is
due in large measure to the very different tactics of the two respective peak
lobby groups: the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) has maintained a
high public profile on native title issues, while the APPEA has been more
circumspect. The reasons for this lower profile are primarily due to the
special characteristics of the petroleum industry. The majority of industry
exploration and production occurs offshore. For example, Wells (1994: 1)
notes that 76 per cent of production occurs on the high seas, 11 per cent in
'territorial' waters and 13 per cent on land. Hence, only 13 per cent of
production is undertaken in what is termed in the NTA an 'onshore place',
with the majority occurring offshore where it is unlikely that native title
property rights can be asserted and where there are no private property
rights (hence the freehold test cannot be applied and there are no
impermissible future acts). Similarly, industry trends indicate that onshore
exploration was already in decline before the passage of the NTA (APEA
1995: 9).
There are other important differences between mining and the petroleum
industry that are noteworthy and that, initially at least, appeared to simplify
potential negotiations with native title parties. Firstly, industry exploration
techniques are relatively low impact compared to mineral exploration, with
some State mining laws allowing a range of activities up to bulk sampling
that is little different from mineral production. (As noted above, in Western
Australia, even mining leases, without an obligation to mine, are being
provided for exploration purposes.) Aerial survey and seismic techniques
used in petroleum exploration extend over large areas but have low
environmental and social impacts; even exploration drilling has a low
impact. Similarly, oil and gas production has a relatively low social
impact: it invariably does not require population concentrations analogous
to new mining towns. Consequently, in terms of compensatory regimes, it
could be argued that companies need not bear a significant financial impost
as their activities do not generate a major negative impact. (However, this
needs to be differentiated from resource rent sharing which is often
confused with compensation in both policy and practice; see Altman 1983,
1996.)
A second feature of the industry is that a disproportionately large (36 per
cent) share of its Australian expenditure of $2.3 billion per annum (five-
year average 1990-91 to 1994-95) is invested in exploration and
development assets (APPEA 1996a: 1). Furthermore, in the petroleum
industry, decisions to undertake a seismic exploration program following
preliminary reconnaissance (which may include gravity and magnetic
aerial survey) are often commercially predicated on an estimate of
potential size of discovery. A combination of these two factors has resulted
in most legislative and regulatory regimes (which vary between States and
Territories) entitling holders of exploration licences or assessment leases to
a production lease if petroleum is discovered. More so than other resource
developers, the petroleum industry requires certainty that successful
exploration will result in production; upfront conjunctive agreements for
onshore activity is the bottom line because a high proportion of total costs
are in the form of upfront exploration and development expenditure.
Petroleum industry concerns about the impacts of native title clearly
articulated by APPEA, the peak industry group, have escalated over the
past year or so. This is partly because the industry has found that native
title issues onshore are not being resolved as quickly as may have been
anticipated in 1993. In particular, uncertainty about the possible co-
existence of native title has made exploration activity on pastoral leasehold
land risky. In Western Australia this potential problem is being
circumvented, with private deals between industry and Indigenous interests
being struck without government involvement; the potential risk is that if
deals have been negotiated with the wrong native title interests,
compensation will need to be paid by industry without government
protection. While for the petroleum industry as a whole this disincentive to
explore is not significant as yet, the impact of the absence of 'greenfields1
options for individual small-scale onshore exploration companies could
drive them overseas (see Industry Commission 1996).
More significantly, however, the industry has found that native title can
impact indirectly on a number of major areas of operation. Of concern has
been the establishment of onshore processing facilities for offshore fields
and perhaps, more significantly, negotiating easements for low impact, but
very long, gas pipelines that require site clearance negotiations with many
different, and at times regionally competing, Indigenous groups. Options
exist in the NTA to make regional agreements in such situations or for
compulsory acquisition of easements; to date governments have been
reluctant to use either because, prior to native title determination, it is
unclear if compensation is required or to whom it should be paid.
Perhaps the worst-case instance of such difficulties, to date, was
experienced by the petroleum industry with respect to the construction by
Tenneco Gas International of a pipeline between Walumbilla and the
Jackson Gas Field in south west Queensland. Some detailed focus on this
negative example may be instructive in terms of the need for statutory
reform that will be considered further below. This is especially the case
because the pipeline agreement was reached within, rather than outside, the
existing NTA framework.
In 1995 an agreement was signed between Tenneco Gas International, the
proposed pipeline operator, and various gas customers for the construction
of a $215 million, 750-kilometre gas pipeline. Prior to beginning
construction of the pipeline or settling on its final route, Tenneco engaged
Aboriginal people to undertake route clearance. Initially, the Nalingu
Association comprising Gungarri people was contracted; subsequently, the
Goolburri Land Council was determined under NTA provisions in April
1995 as the Native Title Representative Body (NTRB) for the region. After
the establishment and funding by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) of Goolburri, six 'land-owning' groups, the
Gungarri, Bidjara, Mandandanji, Mardigan Kullili and Wokanmarra were
each funded to identify and locate people from their group so that a
cultural heritage survey could be conducted along the proposed route.
About $200,000 was provided by Tenneco and the Queensland Office of
the Coordinator-General for this route clearance.
In February 1996, a boundary dispute developed between the Goolburri
Land Council and the Gungarri with respect to who had traditional owner
authority for a section of the pipeline; it was asserted that the Bidjara
should be recognised as the correct spokespeople. Subsequently, Gungarri
people camped across the pipeline route, thereby stopping construction and
lodged an injunction in the Federal Court. In May 1996, after four months
delay, Justice Drummond refused to grant the Gungarri an injunction to
stop construction, ruling that there was no evidence to suggest that the
building of a pipeline would impair Gungarri people's native title rights to
the land ('Pipeline injunction denied', Courier Mail, 4 May 1996). In the
meantime, and at some considerable financial cost, Tenneco Gas
International had leapfrogged a 108-kilometre section of the pipeline to
which it would return in August 1996 so as to comply with project
requirements to complete pipeline construction by 1997.
This case is replete with implications. On the one hand, it must be
emphasised that Tenneco Gas International's willingness to operate within
the framework of the NTA and negotiate with the determined NTRB is
laudable. The dispute between sections of the Goolburri Land Council that
resulted in delay reflects in part the fact that this NTRB is in an early
establishment phase and will take time to fully develop into an efficient,
professional and fully-representative body. More importantly, it
demonstrates the risks for the industry of dealing with NTRBs that do not
currently have mandatory statutory functions to identify all potential native
title claimants to a future act (in this case the pipeline easement) nor the
statutory requirement to sign off an agreement. It demonstrates that the
pivotal role of NTRBs was not clearly understood when the NTA was
originally passed. Resistance by both industry and State governments to
their establishment as statutory bodies charged with ensuring an orderly
claims and RTN process have contributed to current difficulties, especially
in situations of multiple claims.
Tenneco worked inside the current NTA framework, but the framework
proved inefficient. This, however, is not an argument to work outside the
framework, because such an approach is fraught with even greater risk,
especially the risk of future invalidity of title and associated high
compensation costs. Rather, it provides evidence of the need to modify the
law. Interestingly, the Queensland State government has not been willing
to intervene to compulsorily acquire the pipeline easement (as allowed
under the NTA) because it does not want to bear the cost of providing
compensation to both native title claimants and, more significantly, to a
very large number of pastoralists.
To summarise, in terms of the above analytical framework, the petroleum
industry, like other resource developers, wants predicability in the
negotiation framework so as to limit transactions costs; to minimise risk of
future invalidity; and to be able to ensure certainty of title. In short, the
industry is seeking clarification of property rights. The major difference
between the petroleum industry and miners is that the industry needs
conjunctive exploration and production agreements; this is a valid desire
because a great deal of exploration expenditure is upfront. This is the
reversal of the process for miners; that is, the RTN needs to be exercised
by native title parties at the exploration rather than at the production stage.
This, in turn, implies that any rent sharing between a company and
Indigenous interests will need to be agreed upfront.
The government proposal: trade-offs for outcomes
At face value, the Howard Government's proposals for changes in the NTA
outlined in the discussion paper 'towards a more workable native title act'
(Commonwealth of Australia 1996) are a very comprehensive response to
industry concerns. This is evident when, for example, the petroleum
industry's concerns, as outlined in APPEA's 'Position Paper on the Native
Title Act 1993' (APPEA 1996b) is compared to the discussion paper.
The overall package implicitly attempts to provide a balance between
industry and Indigenous interests. The amendments have a pragmatic focus
on both statutory and administrative workability. Unfortunately, the
proposed package has not been viewed, or clearly presented, in this manner
and subsequent negotiations and modifications may result in future
unworkability.
Within the Government's discussion paper four conceptual trade-offs can
be identified from an economics perspective that could balance perceived
competing industry and Indigenous interests.
The first trade-off proposes to modify the future acts procedure by
eliminating the RTN at exploration, but maintaining it at the production
stage, and reducing the time frame for negotiation and arbitration, thus
potentially reducing transactions costs considerably (Commonwealth of
Australia 1996: 13-19). This can be seen as very positive from an industry
perspective, with the time frame for the RTN being reduced from a current
period of a maximum 20 months to eight months. This industry concession
is targeted primarily at the mining industry rather than the petroleum
industry, which would need the RTN at exploration, with conjunctivity to
production (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 14). In exchange, provision
is made for the payment of a share of profits to native title parties, both in
private agreements and in arbitration (Commonwealth of Australia 1996:
2). From the industry perspective, an unintended disjunctivity is removed;
from the Indigenous perspective, an unintended incentive for industry to
seek arbitration (where reference to profits is not allowed in making a
determination) is removed. For both, transactions costs are reduced and an
incentive structure is created to encourage parties to reach agreement.
The second trade-off maintains the once-only RTN for claimants, as well
as determined native title holders, but a longer time frame (increased from
two to three months) for lodgment of claims in response to a future act
notification is introduced as a plus for Indigenous parties (Commonwealth
of Australia 1996: 2). But the higher threshold for the registration test for
native title claims (which will ultimately reduce the number of claims) is a
plus for industry (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 16-28). Both
measures reduce the risk for industry of potentially invalid future acts.
Some pragmatic Indigenous interests recognise the need for a threshold for
registration, but others oppose such amendment because it will place the
onus back on native title parties to prove association with an area rather
than accepting that native title exists because it has not been extinguished.
The third trade-off provides automatic renewal of pre-1994 mining and
production leases (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 15) as intended in
the NTA and this again removes a degree of uncertainty and provides a
degree of predictability for industry and must be regarded as an important
win. A possible trade-off is that there will be no legislated extinguishment
of native title on pastoral leases, with or without the reservation
(Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 11-13). This is an immediate plus for
Indigenous parties, but could be of limited significance if the High Court
finds in favour of pastoral interests and governments in the Wik appeal
(and in subsequent cases in other States).
The final trade-off recommends the establishment of a mandatory statutory
framework for NTRBs that would require them to undertake a range of
activities including acting as a conduit for native title claims to the NNTT,
as a mediator of conflict between competing native title interests and as a
negotiator on behalf of appropriate native title interests with respect to
future acts (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 28-32). This could be
regarded as an important plus for Indigenous interest especially if the
Commonwealth realistically resources NTRBs to undertake these
additional mandatory functions.
The quasi-monopoly status proposed for NTRBs that will require them to
lodge all claims and to signoff agreements on behalf of native title parties
will provide industry with the degree of certainty that is currently evident
in agreements negotiated by Aboriginal land councils in the Northern
Territory. Realism suggests that a statutory role for NTRBs, as
recommended in the ATSIC-sponsored review of last year, will provide the
only cost-effective means for government to finance and administer native
title representation, in contrast to the option of funding hundreds of
individual claimant groups (ATSIC 1995: 95). Some industry interests
regard this as a negative proposal because they want to deal directly with
traditional owners (native title parties). However, given the above-
mentioned risks associated with the possibility of multiple claimants, such
a view has many disadvantages (see Altman 1996).
In summary, an NTA framework amended in accordance with government
proposals will deliver important outcomes for the petroleum industry. First,
more streamlined future act notification and negotiation procedures will
greatly reduce transactions costs. Second, there will be assurance of a
once-only RTN. Third, there will be more information about cost
parameters via the provision for rent sharing with native title parties at the
production stage. And finally, a statutory framework with mandatory
functions for NTRBs will deliver a higher degree of certainty that industry
interests are dealing with the correct native title parties.
Industry strategic choices: some options
Given that the Government's proposals for reform focus heavily on
ensuring positive outcomes for industry, how can the industry itself
facilitate their implementation?
The industry (and the Howard Government) needs to provide strong
incentives to Indigenous parties to actively participate in the reform
process, because earlier experience has indicated their acumen in
mobilising political opposition (in this case the Senate) to unpalatable
reform. In any negotiations for change, it must be recognised that
experience with Aboriginal land rights law indicates that Indigenous
interests oppose the view that a change in Federal government means that
the law can change, especially when the existing statute has resulted from
earlier substantial concessions. To further proposed amendment to the
NTA, the petroleum industry needs to recognise that Indigenous interests
perceive that they made important concessions in 1993 when negotiating
the NTA; Indigenous leaders are therefore understandably very reluctant to
make further concessions from the 1993 benchmarks incorporated in
existing law.
In particular, it must not be overlooked that the RTN is a far weaker form
of property right than the right of veto which remains the preferred
Indigenous position. Unfortunately, from an economics perspective, the
additional leverage provided by the right of veto actually provides greater
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incentives for Indigenous interests to be pro-development (see Industry
Commission 1991). Furthermore, in the Northern Territory there is
provision in land rights law for Indigenous parties not just to negotiate a
share of rents with industry (as is now proposed for the NTA), but also to
share rents with the government (Altman 1996).
The petroleum industry itself faces a broad trade-off, in my opinion, with
respect to its response to the proposed package of amendments. One option
is to aim for minimalist and piecemeal reform that will only operate as a
short-term stopgap. The other is to seek maximalist and workable
amendments, a comprehensive approach to workability of the NTA
framework. The risks associated with the former approach are that future
unworkability will, in itself, generate ongoing uncertainty linked to
strategic behaviour by all parties seeking additional amendment.
Unworkability might also force industry parties to operate outside the NTA
framework, with associated high risks of delay, disputation and possible
future invalidity. Possible problems with the latter approach are that it will
take time to achieve consensus between all parties (including bipartisan
political support) and industry interests might need to make financial
concessions, within statutory parameters, to gain support for proposed
reform.
The strategic choice facing the petroleum industry is to ensure that
amendments to the NTA are the best possible for the industry as a whole,
rather than for individual companies. What is best for longer-term
certainty, and associated economic gain, is for the industry to recognise
commonalities with Indigenous interests and to form a strategic alliance to
ensure rational amendments of the statute. After all, it is becoming patently
clear that the current framework is hardly working optimally for
Indigenous interests.
At the same time, there are continuing indications that the two key
resource-rich States of Western Australia and Queensland remain
committed to (behaving strategically with the aim of) demonstrating that
the NTA is unworkable, irrespective of proposed amendments. Indeed, it
could be questioned whether, as government parties, they are negotiating in
good faith with both native title parties and industry as required under
section 31 of the NTA. The petroleum industry needs to consider options
for forming a strategic alliance with the Commonwealth to demonstrate to
the States that it will work within the NTA framework.
Three issues might be considered by the petroleum industry to demonstrate
goodwill and a strategic positioning on the moral high ground.
First is the issue of negotiations between industry and native title parties. It
is important that industry associations, like APPEA, facilitate the
11
establishment of, and compliance with, industry standards for negotiations
with native title parties. In particular, all industry members should work
within, rather than outside, an amended NTA framework. Ensuring a
consistent industry approach will be difficult because of diversity within
the industry. In particular, some industry members, such as small
exploration companies operating onshore, have competitive advantage
from long-term relationships with particular traditional owners that
amounts to a form of business goodwill. There will be continual pressure
from such companies to negotiate directly with native title parties rather
than via NTRBs. This pressure is increased because some NTRBs, such as
the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, do not want a mandatory
role and currently encourage industry and native title parties to negotiate
direct (as in the case of the proposed Moomba Pipeline). This demonstrates
that Indigenous interests themselves are not united, which makes the role
of industry associations in negotiations more difficult. Industry standards
can also be extended to include the establishment of, and compliance with,
codes of conduct for negotiations with native title parties and the lobbying
for amendments to petroleum statutes at State level to ensure strict site
protection and appropriate negotiation procedures where the RTN is not
applied. The widened scope and additional flexibility for agreements under
section 21 of the NTA proposed by the Howard Government
(Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 19-20) should be supported by the
petroleum industry because pipelines traverse large regions.
Second, it is important that proposals to strengthen the statutory framework
for NTRBs are supported by industry because experience elsewhere, and
especially in the Northern Territory, indicates that statutory authorities
(land councils) provide industry with the greatest certainty. After all, even
a once-only RTN can generate considerable transactions costs if a
company needs to deal with a number of different claimant groups, with
each one possibly taking a different negotiating position. While providing
little solace to companies that are experiencing difficulties with NTRBs as
currently constituted, it must be recognised that these organisations will
need time to evolve into professional and effective representative bodies; a
price is already being paid for earlier opposition to establish these bodies
with mandatory functions. The Howard Government's proposals to make
NTRBs more accountable both to their constituencies and to government
will hasten their development. But it is essential that, with any expanded
mandatory functions, NTRBs are adequately resourced. Industry, as well as
native title parties, will benefit; any reduction in financial support to
NTRBs in the current fiscal climate will have ramifications for industry.
Third, it is important that appropriate rent sharing parameters are
established in the NTA to provide incentives for native title parties to be
pro-development. However, these incentives, as argued elsewhere (Altman
1996), should not extend to rentsharing at the exploration stage because no
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mineral rent is generated at this stage. Furthermore, it is difficult for the
industry to argue that it bears a heavy tax and royalty burden when
individual companies break ranks and continue to provide exploration
sweeteners. Instead, it would be preferable for rent sharing with native title
parties to be allowed within statutorily imposed limits. It is suggested that
a negotiated royalty of between 1-3 per cent ad valorem, on a sliding scale
depending on level of production, be incorporated in the statute or
regulations. Alternatives that could be considered would include equity
options at the production stage and provision of jobs and training. Both
would allow companies to assess commercial risk within stipulated limits.
The recent agreement between Naylor Ingram Pty Limited and Anangu
Pitjantjatjara for petroleum exploration and production in the north of
South Australia is indicative of current industry deals. Payments in this
agreement are made on a sliding scale of 1.5 to 2.5 per cent ad valorem on
all exploration costs, a financial impost that must represent a disincentive
to explorers unless made a legal tax deduction. A negotiated royalty on a
sliding scale of between 1 per cent and 3 per cent ad valorem at production
has been negotiated. As well, a risk-free buy-in option for Anangu
Pitjantjatjaraku is available that will allow the purchase of up to 10 per
cent of a production joint venture on payment, pro rata, of exploration
expenditure ('Aboriginal council in SA oil deal', The Australian Financial
Review, 28 February 1996).
Finally, in terms of creating incentive structures for native title parties to
facilitate petroleum exploration and production, a strong case can be made
to the Commonwealth that it, as well as the petroleum industry, needs to
share rent with Indigenous interests. In the Northern Territory, under the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, the equivalent of
all onshore petroleum royalties paid to the Territory government at a rate
of 10 per cent ad valorem are paid to Aboriginal interests by the
Commonwealth. Similarly, in South Australia under the State
Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 two-thirds of statutory royalties are
payable to Indigenous interests. Most returns from the Naylor Ingram
Agreement, at production, will result from the State government foregoing
most of its statutory royalties in favour of Indigenous interests. The
Commonwealth receives considerable revenue from offshore petroleum
resource rentals (APEA 1995: 23) where no native title property rights
exist. The Commonwealth needs to consider options for hypothecating an
equivalent of a proportion of statutory royalties raised by State
governments onshore as a means of establishing an incentives regime for
native title parties to support petroleum industry activity. Alternatively,
State governments could pay a share of their statutory royalties from
onshore production to native title parties and the Commonwealth could
allow the Commonwealth Grants Commission to regard this as a revenue-
raising disability in its fiscal-equalisation calculations.
13
Conclusion
It has been argued previously that it is very difficult to test the workability
of the NTA framework because of the past strategic behaviour of all
parties, especially State and Territory governments (Altman 1995). Some
two and a half years after passage of native title law, this is still the case,
although there is growing recognition by most parties that the NTA needs
amendment.
Under these circumstances, it is important that peak bodies such as APPEA
take a leadership role in strategically representing industry participants.
Despite industry diversity, peak bodies can present a united front for the
accepted benefit of the industry as a whole. This is a potential advantage in
negotiations that both Indigenous interests and governments may not share.
Attaining workability of the NTA will take time, recognition of the
concerns of Indigenous interests, and careful consideration and
implementation of proposed amendments to the statutory framework.
Piecemeal and hasty reform will prove unworkable and will itself generate
future strategic behaviour that will increase transactions costs and
uncertainty for the petroleum industry. It is suggested here that it is
important that the very particular requirements of the petroleum industry
are catered for in reform, especially of the RTN. The industry could
facilitate this reform process by building alliances with both Indigenous
interests and the Commonwealth. But it remains essential that whatever
reforms are introduced represent a cohesive and comprehensive package
that makes the NTA more workable for all parties.
References
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 1995. Review of Native
Title Representative Bodies 1995, ATSIC, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. 1983. Aborigines and Mining Royalties in the Northern Territory,
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. 1995. 'Native Title Act 1993: implementation issues for resource
developers', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 88, Centre for Aboriginal Economic
Policy Research, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. 1996. 'Reforming financial aspects of the Native Title Act 1993: an
economics perspective', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 105, Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Australian Petroleum Exploration Association (APEA) Limited 1995. 'Petroleum
exploration and production industry1, unpublished paper, APEA, Canberra, March
1995.
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) Limited 1996a.
'Petroleum exploration and production industry: financial survey 1994/95',
unpublished paper, APPEA, Canberra.
14
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) Limited
1996b. 'Position paper on Native Title Act 1993', unpublished paper, APPEA,
Canberra.
Coase, R.H. 1960. The problem of social cost', Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1):
1-44.
Commonwealth of Australia 1996. Towards a more workable Native Title Act: an
outline of proposed amendments', Native Title Branch, Office of Indigenous
Affairs, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra.
Davie, C. 1996. The 'Right to Negotiate' under the Native Title Act 1993', APPEA
Journal, vol. 1, 1996.
Ewing, G. 1994. The Australian mining industry and the Native Title Act 1993',
unpublished paper delivered at the General Practice Section, Law Council of
Australia Conference, 24-26 August 1994.
Industry Commission 1991. Mining and Mineral Processing in Australia, Report No. 7,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Industry Commission 1996. Implications for Australia of Firms Locating Offshore,
Draft Report, Industry Commission, Canberra.
McKenna, S.L. 1995. 'Assessing the relative allocative efficiency of the Native Title Act
1993 and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, CAEPR
Discussion Paper No. 79, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The
Australian National University, Canberra.
Vickery, E. 1995. 'Native title: its effects on exploration', APEA Journal, 35 (1): 774-
82.
Wells, R. 1994. Address to the Working With the Native Title Act Conference, Sydney,
16 May 1994.
Wells, R. 1995. 'Native Title Act 1993: a petroleum perspective', paper presented at the
Mabo and Native Titles seminar, Sydney, 14-15 April 1995.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
(CAEPR)
RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS
92/1995 Twenty years of policy recommendations for indigenous education:
overview and research implications, R.G. Schwab.
93/1995 The economic status of indigenous Australian families, A.E. Daly and
D.E. Smith.
94/1995 Equity for Aboriginal families in the 1990s: the challenges for social policy,
J. Finlayson.
95/1995 Native title and indigenous Australian utilisation of wildlife: policy
perspectives, J.C. Altman, H.J. Bek and L.M. Roach.
96/1995 Change in the relative distribution of indigenous employment by industry,
1986-91, J. Taylor and Liu Jin.
97/1995 Estimating the private rate of return to education for indigenous
Australians, A.E. Daly and Liu Jin.
98/1995 Coping with locational advantage: the economic development potential of
tourism at Seisia community, Cape York Peninsula, J.C. Altman.
99/1995 Redfern works: the policy and community challenges of an urban CDEP
scheme, D.E. Smith.
100/1995 The calculus of reciprocity: principles and implications of Aboriginal
sharing, R.G. Schwab.
101/1995 Money, business and culture: issues for Aboriginal economic policy,
D.F. Martin.
102/1995 Indigenous peoples and reshaping Australian institutions: two perspectives,
N. Pearson and W. Sanders.
103/1996 Policy implications of rising Aboriginal fertility in the early 1990s,
H. Tesfaghiorghis.
104/1996 Change in the relative occupational status of Indigenous workers, 1986-91,
J. Taylor and J. Liu.
105/1996 Reforming financial aspects of the Native Title Act 1993: an economics
perspective, J.C. Altman.
106/1996 Indigenous Australians and the socioeconomic status of urban
neighbourhoods, B. Hunter.
107/1996 The comparative economic status of CDEP and non-CDEP community
residents in the Northern Territory in 1991, J.C. Altman and B. Hunter.
108/1996 Indigenous participation in labour market and training programs, J. Taylor
and B. Hunter.
109/1996 The economic status of Indigenous Australian households: a statistical and
ethnographic analysis, D.E. Smith and A.E. Daly.
110/1996 Income poverty among Indigenous families with children: estimates from the
1991 Census, R.T. Ross and A. Mikalauskas.
111/1996 Having it 'both ways': the continuing complexities of community-controlled
Indigenous education, R.G. Schwab.
112/1996 The geographic distribution of unemployment-related benefits and CDEP
scheme employment, J.C. Altman and B. Hunter.
113/1996 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development
Corporation: a new approach to enterprise?, W.S. Arthur.
114/1996 CDEP as urban enterprise: the case of Yarnteen Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islanders Corporation, Newcastle, D.E. Smith.
115/1996 The determinants of Indigenous employment outcomes: the importance of
education and training, B. Hunter.
116/1996 Linking accountability and self-determination in Aboriginal organisations,
D.F. Martin and J.D. Finlayson.
117/1996 Aboriginal health and institutional reform within Australian federalism,
I. Anderson and W. Sanders.
118/1996 Short-term Indigenous population mobility and service delivery, J. Taylor.
119/1996 Indigenous labour force status to the year 2000: estimated impacts of recent
Budget cuts, B. Hunter and J. Taylor.
120/1996 Community involvement in education: an exploration of American Indian
education policy and implications for Australia, R.G. Schwab.
121/1996 Towards greater autonomy for Torres Strait: political and economic
dimensions, J.C. Altman, W.S. Arthur and W. Sanders.
122/1996 Indigenous participation in higher education: culture, choice and human
capital theory, R.G. Schwab.
123/1996 Estimating the social rate of return to education for Indigenous Australians,
P.N. Junankar and J. Liu.
124/1996 The right to negotiate and native title future acts: implications of the Native
Title Amendment Bill 1996, D.E. Smith.
125/1996 Native title and the petroleum industry: recent developments, options, risks
and strategic choices, J.C. Altman
126/1996 Aboriginal economic development and land rights in the Northern Territory:
past performance, current issues and strategic options, J.C. Altman.
For information on earlier CAEPR Discussion Papers please contact Publication
Sales, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Faculty of Arts, Australian
National University, Canberra ACT 0200. Phone (06) 279 8211 Fax (06) 249 2789.
Abstracts of all CAEPR Publications can be found at the following WWW address:
http://online.anu.edu/caepr/


